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Patents as a tool to encourage the production of healthier food 
 
Enrico Bonadio 
 
Abstract 
 
The need to supply consumers with healthier food and beverages constitutes an urgent 
priority as many people in both industrialized and developing countries struggle with obesity 
and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs) caused by the consumption of unhealthy 
products. 
 This chapter makes the point that patents may contribute to fighting such illnesses. 
Three proposals are put forward. The first and second proposals give healthy food inventions 
a preferential treatment with a view to speeding up or facilitating their patenting process. The 
third proposal would consist of excluding from patentability certain food inventions if it is 
proven that the relevant products or processes are harmful to human health.  
 Such proposals would comply with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and are in line with the general aim of the patent system, 
namely encouraging (before) and rewarding (later) the creation of inventions really useful to 
society. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
2 
 
Could patents contribute to incentivizing companies to manufacture and market healthier 
foodstuffs and beverages? How could the patent system be amended to enable such a 
contribution and thus play a role in the fight against diseases caused by the consumption of 
unhealthy food? More generally, is the patent system suitable for carrying out such tasks? In 
this chapter I will try to answer these questions. In doing so I will put forward three 
proposals. 
 As is well known, the need to supply healthy food and beverages1 constitutes an 
urgent priority as many people in both industrialized and developing countries struggle with 
obesity and other NCDs caused by the consumption of unhealthy products. Such need has 
been stressed in several international fora such as the 2004 World Health Organization 
(WHO) Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the 2011 United Nations (UN) 
Political Declaration on NCDs and the WHO Global Action Plan for the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs 2013–20.2 
 Some recent data clarifies why it is important to take action urgently. Obesity 
worldwide has more than doubled since 1980. In 2014, more than 1.9 billion adults were 
overweight. Of these over 600 million were obese. That means that 39 per cent of adults were 
overweight in 2014 and 13 per cent were obese. Most of the world’s population live in 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter, I will use the general term ‘food’ to refer to both food and beverages.  
2
 WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (2004), WHA57.17; Political Declaration 
of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-
communicable Diseases, GA Res 2, UN GAOR, 66th session, 3rd plenary meeting, UN Doc 
A/Res/66/2 (2012); WHO Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs, Resolution 
WHA66.10 endorsed by the 66th WHO World Health Assembly. 
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countries where being overweight and obesity kill more people than being underweight. And 
42 million children under the age of five were overweight or obese in 2013.3 
 It is also well known that obesity increases the risk of NCDs, such as coronary heart 
disease, stroke, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer (including endometrial, breast and colon 
cancer), cholesterol, liver and gallbladder disease, infertility and mental health conditions. 
NCDs kill 38 million people each year worldwide, and an unhealthy diet is the main risk 
factor. Also, 2.8 million people die yearly as a result of diet-related NCDs.4 
 Obesity and other illnesses derived from the consumption of unhealthy food also 
entail high economic costs for societies and cause reduced work productivity. 
 This chapter will make the point that using the patent system and, in particular, 
amending certain of its substantial and procedural rules, may be one of the answers to the 
above problems. Indeed, I believe that patent law, far from being neutral, should deal with 
these issues and be capable of pushing food companies into manufacturing healthier products. 
This belief can be echoed in the words of the former Director General of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Pascal Lamy: ‘the international intellectual property system cannot 
operate in isolation from broader public policy questions, such as how to meet human needs 
as basic as health [and] food …’.5 It should also be remembered that the right to health, 
which includes the right to consume healthy food, is protected as a fundamental and human 
                                                 
3
 WHO, Media Centre, Obesity and Overweight, January 2015, 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en> accessed 18 November 2015. 
4
 Such data have been presented by Paolo Vergano at the 2015 Summer Academy in Global Food Law 
and Policy on 22 July 2015, in Bilbao, Spain <http://www.albertoalemanno.eu/academy> accessed 18 
November 2015. 
5
 Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, talk given at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Conference on IP and Public Policy Issues, Geneva, 14 July 2009, see 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl131_e.htm> accessed 18 November 2015. 
4 
 
right by international and regional provisions, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights: ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food …’.6 The European Union (EU) is 
also particularly keen to protect people’s health. Indeed, the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights reminds us that ‘a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the 
definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities’.7 
 
2. Food-related patents: some examples 
 
The proposals I will highlight seem to be timely as food and beverage-related patents are 
increasingly applied for and/or granted around the world, especially in the USA. An 
examination of several databases has revealed the existence of many patents related to new 
and improved foodstuffs. 
 Take, for example, the US Patent No 5260087 covering an invention entitled ‘Fat 
and egg yolk substitute for use in baking and process for using substitute’.8 As is explained in 
the patent’s specification, fats and eggs produce desirable taste and sensory qualities in the 
baked goods, but also contribute much fat and cholesterol to the baked items. The main 
purpose of this invention is to provide a low-fat compound which can be used in baking 
cookies and cakes as a substitute for fats and egg yolks, while still producing the desired 
product taste and sensory qualities. Such an invention further aims to provide a very low fat 
compound and a method of using it that will not only produce a tasty and tender baked item, 
but will also contribute to increased item shelf life. 
                                                 
6
 Article 25. 
7
 Article 35. 
8
 The patent application was filed with the USPTO in July 1992 and the patent has therefore expired. 
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 The US patent No 8647696 is also relevant.9 The invention comprises a shelf-stable 
and low fat food containing gas bubbles. The applicant notes in the specification demonstrate 
the food industry’s need to meet low fat targets while keeping the taste of the product as 
appealing as possible:  
Particularly in the West, obesity is a major cause for concern. Health conscious 
consumers are increasingly looking for products that have low fat and calorific content. 
However, they are often not prepared to accept healthier alternatives that have poor (or 
even different) taste and/or texture to the traditional products. Thus, food manufacturers 
face the problem of making low fat alternatives to some of the consumers’ favourite 
products such as desserts, cooking sauces and salad dressings that not only taste as 
good but that also give the same texture and sensation in the mouth when eaten. Fat 
plays an important role in giving products their distinctive texture as well as taste. 
Although fat can be removed and/or substituted to produce a healthier product, if it 
does not have the same organoleptic properties as the equivalent ‘full fat’ alternative it 
may not meet with customer acceptance. 
 Analogous concerns are expressed in the description of the US patent 6485775 
covering a starchy food-based fine particle useful as a fat substitute in a variety of food 
products: 
For many years, doctors have recommended low fat diets. Accordingly, the food 
industry has directed substantial effort at finding fat substitutes which demonstrate the 
taste and mouth feel characteristics of fats without their detrimental properties … 
Potato granules and flakes are commercially available sources of dehydrated potato 
product having known characteristics. However, they have not been used as a fat 
                                                 
9
 The application was filed with the USPTO on 9 December 2009 and the patent was granted on 11 
February 2014. 
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mimetic. There is a need for an inexpensive fat mimetic which does not have the 
detrimental effects of fat on the consumer. 
 A similar invention is described in the international patent No WO 2013162802 A1, 
which refers to fat particle compositions containing salt, dough and baked-dough articles 
made therefrom, and related methods.10 The specification explains that: 
... these fat particles can be used to prepare dough formulations that meet the desire of 
being more healthful than previous dough formulations due to a reduced sodium 
content, optional more healthful fat content (e.g., low trans fats or low saturated fats), 
or both … These days, consumers, regulators, and food companies desire to lower total 
sodium content in food products … Fats typically used in these types of dough products 
are triglyceride-based fats that commonly contain a fairly high level of saturated fats 
and trans fatty acids. Due to a present trend toward healthier dough and bakery 
products, there is demand for products that contain healthier fats (i.e., having a reduced 
amount of saturated fats and trans fatty acids) without sacrificing taste and baking 
performance of the dough. In view of the foregoing, alternative fat compositions that 
are low in saturated and trans fatty acids are very desirable . . . 
 The above are just a few examples of patents that protect healthier food products or 
processes. They show the interest of certain sectors of the food industry in fighting obesity 
and related illnesses by developing improved foodstuffs and accordingly meeting the 
concerns of an increasingly conscious category of consumers aware of the risks stemming 
from the consumption of highly fatty and calorific products. 
 
3. Proposals to amend patent regimes to incentivize the production of healthy foodstuffs 
 
                                                 
10
 This international patent application was filed through the PCT route on 22 March 2013. 
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The trend of healthy food patenting is certainly a positive step for the purpose of enhancing 
consumers’ health. The fact that food companies spontaneously feel the need to come up with 
healthier products, even where prompted by the mere desire to pursue commercial profits, is 
not only a trend that should be praised, it should also be incentivized. 
 That is why I propose to utilise and amend patent regimes and procedures with the 
specific aim of encouraging the production of healthier foodstuffs. The first and second 
proposals are ‘positive’ as they aim at speeding up or facilitating the patenting process for 
foods that are considered, and proven to be, healthy.11 The third proposal would instead 
consist of excluding from patentability inventions related to food if it is proven that the 
relevant products or processes contain unhealthy ingredients. It is therefore a ‘negative’ 
proposal. As noted by Friedrich-Karl Beier back in 1972, if the aim of the patent system is to 
stimulate inventions that are useful to people, then ‘two conclusions should be self-evident: 
first, inventions that are of no use or even damaging to society should not be patented, and, 
second, inventions that are of special and particular utility … for society should be patentable 
and even enjoy preferential treatment’.12 
 
Fast-track procedures for patent applications related to healthy food 
 
                                                 
11
 Not so different from the proposals highlighted by Estelle Derclaye in relation to environmentally 
sound inventions in ‘Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet? An Inquiry from the Point of View of 
Environmental Law: Part 2’ (2009) International Energy Law Review 229–37. 
12
 Friedrich-Karl Beier, ‘Future Problems of Patent Law’ (1972) 3(4) International Review of Industrial 
Property and Copyright Law 423–50, 441 and 443 (also wondering: ‘should we not accord preferential 
treatment to inventions that are of special significance for society, examine them more quickly, publish 
them earlier, and protect them more broadly?’). 
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The first proposal would consist of setting up a fast-track procedure for patent applications 
covering foodstuffs that contain macronutrients such as proteins, vitamins, iodate or other 
healthy ingredients so as to provide an expedited examination of the relevant patentability 
requirements. The target is to incentivize the production of healthy food. This seems to be in 
line with the aim of the patent system, which is to encourage and reward the making of 
inventions useful to society. 
 As a general remark, the idea that certain socially useful technologies should be 
given priority and special treatment is not new. Several national medicines regulators already 
provide an accelerated review process for the most important drugs. The US Food and Drug 
Administration is one of these. It has indeed expedited its review process for medicines that 
treat serious or life-threatening diseases.13 
 ‘Speedy’ patent procedures are already available in several countries and can be 
used for any kind of technology: the European and the UK patent offices are good 
examples.14 The US Patent Office also has in place a three-track prioritized examination 
system that allows applicants in any field of technology to choose between three examination 
procedures: prioritized examination, normal examination and delayed examination. Such 
accelerated proceedings produce certain advantages as they permit applicants to begin 
                                                 
13
 Fast-track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, US Food and Drug Administration: see 
<http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm3583
01.pdf> accessed 18 November 2015. 
14
 The EPO has an accelerated examination procedure in place that anyone can use at no additional cost. 
The UK Patent Office offers three different types of accelerated examination. The first two types, 
Combined Search and Examination and Early Publication, are available to anyone upon request. The 
third one is Accelerated Search and Examination, which aims at issuing a search report within four 
months of the application. 
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licensing their inventions sooner, thus reducing the time to reach the market and accordingly 
speeding up the dissemination of the relevant products. 
 Fast-track patent procedures have also been, or are currently being offered, in 
relation to specific sectors, for example, in the field of green technologies: pioneering 
countries have been the USA,15 the UK, Australia, South Korea, Israel, Canada and Japan.16 
These programmes have been set up with a view to reducing the time needed for an 
application regarding environmentally sound technologies, permitting ‘green’ applicants to 
obtain patents sooner and thus encouraging further innovation in this socially relevant field.17 
Indeed, for industries where there is a very urgent need for the development of new 
technologies, like the renewable energy sector, delay hurts both inventors and the public.18 
 Reserving accelerated procedures to socially important inventions does not 
constitute an absolute novelty either. In 1959 US patent provisions already included an 
exception to the examination order, clarifying that applications could be assessed out of turn 
if ‘the inventions are deemed of peculiar importance to some brunch of the public service and 
the head of some department of the Government requests immediate due action for that 
                                                 
15
 The USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program closed in early 2012. 
16
 The first country to launch this programme was the UK in May 2009; see Press Release, UK 
Intellectual Property Office, ‘UK “Green” Inventions to Get Fast-Tracked through Patent System’, see 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-
release/press-release-2009/press-release-20090512.htm> accessed 18 November 2015. See also Eric 
Lane, Clean Tech Intellectual Property: Eco-marks, Green Patents, and Green Innovation (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 218–26. 
17
 Amanda Patton, ‘When Patent Offices Become Captain Planet: Green Technology and Accelerated 
Patent Examination Programs in the United States and Abroad’ (2012) 3(3) Intellectual Property Brief 
30. 
18
 Sarah Tran, ‘Expediting Innovation’ (2012) 36 Harvard Environmental Law Review 123, 139. 
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reason’.19 Similar procedures are now offered in other countries as well. The Australian 
Patent Office, for example, has in place an ‘expedited examination’ system that allows patent 
applications to be assessed more rapidly if the commissioner believes that it ‘is in the public 
interest’ or that ‘there are special circumstances that make it desirable’.20 The Japanese Patent 
Office (JPO) has also operated since 1986 an accelerated examination programme, amended 
in 2004, which applies inter alia to socially relevant inventions, such as earthquake disaster 
recovery technology.21 
 Also in light of the above, I believe that introducing fast-track procedures for 
socially relevant inventions like healthy foodstuffs would not be ‘revolutionary’. There 
would be no need for big procedural changes. Applicants that ask for the proposed fast-track 
would just need to mention in the application that their products or processes contain healthy 
ingredients.22 And patent examiners should be tasked with confirming this. It is important 
                                                 
19
 See 37 CFR §1.102 (1959); Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, Republication of Regulations, 24 Fed 
reg. 10,332, 10,340 (22 December 1959) (recording 37 CFR §1.102 (1959)). 
20
 Patent Regulations 1991 (Cth), reg. 3.17(2)(a)–(b) (Australia). 
21
 The other categories of inventions admitted to the Japanese programme are now: (i) working-related 
applications; (ii) internationally filed applications; (iii) applications filed by small and medium-sized 
enterprises, individuals, universities, public research institutes etc; (iv) green technology related 
applications; and (v) Asian business location law related applications. See the Outline of Accelerated 
Examination and Accelerated Appeal Examination (Patents), JPO (23 July 2004), Outline of 
Accelerated Examination and Accelerated Appeal Examination (Patents), JPO (23 July 2004), see 
<http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e> accessed 18 November 2015).  
22
 A similar feature is shared by fast-track procedures adopted in the field of green technologies by the 
UK, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Israel and Canada. Simple statements by applicants are here 
sufficient, and patent offices do not require them to provide particular evidence to show the 
‘environmentally friendliness’ of their inventions. See Antoine Dechezleprêtre, ‘Fast-Tracking Green 
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that applicants should not bear the burden of proof that the invention is healthy: otherwise, 
food companies or individual inventors may be discouraged from innovating in this socially 
important sector.23 
 As has already been proposed in relation to fast-track procedures for green 
patenting,24 it would be wise to devise this fast-track procedure in the context of an 
international treaty. A treaty that could serve this purpose is the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT),25 which assists applicants in obtaining patent protection internationally for their 
inventions and helps offices with their decisions to grant or refuse the patent. An international 
harmonization of fast-track procedures would help in overcoming the difficulties stemming 
from differences between national fast-track procedures. Such differences may indeed make 
participation in multiple fast-track programmes expensive and lengthy, as applicants who 
wish to protect their inventions in several jurisdictions would have to comply with different 
procedural rules. An international harmonized fast-track programme, with similar rules and 
requirements, would instead reduce burdens on applicants and thus speed up and make 
cheaper the patenting process for healthy foodstuffs. It would also boost participation. 
Additional burdens on applicants should also be avoided, such as conducting prior art 
                                                                                                                                                       
Patent Applications – An Empirical Analysis’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development paper No 37 (ICTSD 2013) 3–4. 
23
 A similar proposal and argument have been put forward in the field of environmentally sound 
technologies: see Estelle Derclaye, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming’ [2008] 12(2) 
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 264–95. 
24
 Eric Lane ‘Building the Global Green Patent Highway: A Proposal for International Harmonization of 
Green Technology Fast Track Programs’ (2012) 27(3) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1119, 1147–
50. 
25
 Patent Cooperation Treaty, agreed at Washington on 19 June 1970, amended on 28 September 1979, 
modified on 3 February 1984 and on 3 October 2001 (as in force from 1 April 2002). 
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searches and analysis, which are usually requested when it comes to patenting ordinary 
inventions. In this way the entire process would be accelerated.26 
 
Exempting healthy food and beverage patent applications from paying fees 
 
The second proposal would consist of exempting applicants for healthy food patents from 
paying patent procedure fees, or at least significantly reducing them. Again, applicants should 
mention the healthiness of their products and processes in the application and patent offices 
should confirm that the inventions in question are healthy. As with the proposal for fast-
tracking, highlighted in the previous section, this proposal would aim at encouraging and 
facilitating patent protection, and production, of healthy foodstuffs. 
 Indeed, patent fees may sometimes be unaffordable, especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises. Take the large number of fees required by the European Patent Office: 
filing fees, search fees, fees per designated state, fees per claim over ten claims, examination 
fees and a fee for the patent grant and printing. US patent procedures are also very expensive. 
Indeed, applicants there must carry out a pre-examination search of all prior art, including 
previous patents and patent applications, and non-patent documentation, which can easily 
cost thousands of dollars in fees.27  
 
Excluding unhealthy food from patentability 
 
                                                 
26
 The above suggestions build upon analogous ones put forward with reference to fast-track programmes 
for green technologies based inventions. See Lane (n. 24 above) 1160–70. 
27
 Tran (n. 18 above) 141. 
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The third proposal would consist of excluding from patentability food products and processes 
that contain an excessive amount of unhealthy ingredients or components such as salt, fat and 
sugar. Specific and clear thresholds identified by health specialists should be introduced in 
order to guide both applicants and patent examiners – and the latter should confirm that the 
relevant invention is harmful to consumers. 
 This proposal may be particularly useful in countries that have recently experienced, 
or might experience in the future, an upsurge in the filing of patent applications related to 
unhealthy food. China seems to have recently witnessed such a trend, as has been noted by 
the Task Group of Patent Examination Cooperation Center of the Chinese Intellectual 
Property Office, which has found that several patents have been granted to food possibly 
harmful to consumers’ health. This has occurred despite the fact that China has recently 
passed nearly 800 laws and regulations to protect food safety and the health and life of 
domestic consumers.28 
 The proposal could be implemented by introducing an ad hoc exclusion from 
patentability of inventions harmful to human health. This type of new category could be 
inserted in patent laws such as the TRIPS Agreement29 and the European Patent Convention 
(EPC),30 right next to the exclusion from patentability of surgical, diagnostic or therapeutic 
                                                 
28
 China Intellectual Property, updated 13 July 2011, see <http://ipr.chinadaily.com.cn/2011–
07/13/content_12895645.htm> accessed 18 November 2015. 
29
 The TRIPS Agreement is one of the WTO Agreements, Annex 1C Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 
January 1995). 
30
 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature 5 October 1973, 1065 UNTS 199 
(entered into force on 7 October 1977). 
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methods,31 which also protects public health, although in another fashion (basically by 
preventing the monopolization of medically important methods).32 
 Alternatively, we could support a broad interpretation of those provisions that 
prohibit the patenting of inventions contrary to ‘ordre public’ and morality. Many 
jurisdictions have introduced such a ban, availing themselves of the relevant TRIPS clause 
(Article 27.2).33 The EPC also states that ‘European patents shall not be granted in respect of 
… inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to “ordre public” or 
morality’ (Article 53-a). The US has not incorporated a statutory ban in this regard, but 
inventions that are considered immoral seem to be excluded from patentability under a judge-
made moral utility doctrine.34 
                                                 
31
 Article 27(3) TRIPS allows countries to exclude from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals. Likewise, Article 53(c) EPC states that ‘European 
patents shall not be granted in respect of . . . methods for treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body.’ 
32
 US patent law permits patenting of medical methods but denies a remedy for its infringement, therefore 
nullifying the right in so far as there is no enforceability. 
33
 Article 27(2) TRIPS provides that countries may exclude from patentability ‘inventions, the prevention 
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment’. 
34
 The moral utility doctrine dates back to Lowell v Lewis in 1817, 15 F Cas, 1018, 1019 (US Court of 
Appeals 1817) (the judge held in this case that ‘the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover, if the 
invention be of mischievous or injurious tendency’ and gave the examples of inventions aimed at 
poisoning people, promoting debauchery and facilitating private assassinations). The doctrine in 
question was also invoked to refuse patents for inventions related to gambling devices (see, for 
example, Reliance Novelty Corp v Dworzek 80 F 902, 904, ND Cal 1897, invalidating the patent for 
‘lack of utility’). Yet, such a doctrine has not been invoked to invalidate patents in recent years, 
prompting several commentators to hold that it is a dead doctrine. See Margo A Bagley, ‘Patent First, 
15 
 
 It could indeed be argued that inventions related to unhealthy food, whose 
consumption may cause obesity and other diseases, should be excluded from patentability on 
these grounds. I am aware that this exception has often been interpreted by courts and patent 
offices, especially in Europe, in a very narrow way.35 Yet, the subject matter seems here to be 
particularly alarming and thus capable of being caught by the provision at issue.36 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law’ (2003) 45(2) William and Mary Law 
Review 469–547. 
35
 See the decisions of the EPO in a string of cases concerning the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions: e.g. (i) Transgenic Animals/HARVARD, Board of Appeal of the EPO, Decision of 6 July 
2004, T 315/03; (ii) T 356/93 Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS, OJ EPO 1995; (iii) Howard 
Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541. The literature on the morality and ordre public exception in the 
biotech sector is extensive: see inter alia Sigrid Sterckx (ed.), Biotechnology, Patents and Morality 
(Ashgate, 2000); Sivaramjani Thambisetty, ‘Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion from 
Patentability under European Law’ (2002) Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 12, 48–
53; Aurora Plomer, Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics Report (2006), see 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~llzwww/StemCellProject/project.report.pdf> accessed 18 November 
2015; Tine Sommer, ‘Interpreting Ordre Public and Morality in a Patent Law Context: Which is the 
Correct Approach?’ (2007) Bio-Science Law Review 62–74; Sigrid Sterckx, ‘The European Patent 
Convention and the (Non-)patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells’ (2008) Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 478; Aurora Plomer and Paul Torremans (eds), Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European 
Patent Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2009); Oliver Mills, Biotechnological Inventions: 
Moral Restraints and Patent Law (Ashgate, 2010); Enrico Bonadio, ‘Biotech Patents and Morality after 
Brüstle’ (2012) European Intellectual Property Review 433–43. 
36
 See the EPO proceedings G 2/06, Comments by the President of the European Patent Office (Alain 
Pompidou), 28 September 2006, p. 14 (noting that Article 53(a) EPC constitutes a blanket clause, 
which ensures the incorporation of fundamental ethical and legal principles in patent law, framed as to 
accommodate future developments).  
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 If such applications are filed in Europe, patent offices could rely on the 
costs/benefits analysis criterion used by the European Patent Office (EPO) in some cases, 
including Onco Mouse Harvard. In the final decision of that saga, the EPO confirmed the 
validity of a patent related to a mouse that had been genetically engineered to develop cancer 
and could be used for anticancer research. It examined, on the one hand, the advantages for 
the treatment of cancer and, on the other, the environmental risks that could stem from the 
use of the said invention, and concluded that the benefits overwhelmed the costs.37 In 
contrast, a patent examiner or judge tasked with assessing a food invention extremely 
harmful to consumers’ health would probably weigh the possible costs (increased chances of 
obesity and other NCDs) and benefits (e.g. keeping the taste of the product as appealing to 
consumers as possible) in favour of the former – and thus refuse the patent. A similar 
outcome was reached by the EPO in Upjohn, where a patent application related to a 
transgenic mouse into which a gene had been inserted so that it would lose its hair was 
rejected. The invention aimed at testing products to treat human baldness and wool 
production techniques: the EPO again used a utilitarian approach and weighed up costs 
(animal suffering) and benefits (research to cure hair loss and improved wool manufacturing 
techniques), but in this case the former obviously outweighed the latter, so the invention was 
deemed immoral and thus not patentable.38 A parallel could therefore be drawn between this 
decision and the case of unhealthy food inventions.39 
                                                 
37
 See again the decision Transgenic Animals/HARVARD (n. 35 above), which confirmed the validity of 
the patent by relying on a costs/benefits analysis (paras 9.1–9.7 and 13.2.1–13.24). See also Guy 
Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 135–36. 
38
 European Patent Application No 89913146.0, filed on 17 November 1989, refused on 25 July 1993. 
39
 The utilitarian approach is not accepted by all scholars, though. Other commentators prefer the so-
called ‘deontological approach’, according to which inventions are considered contrary to public policy 
and morality even though they bring more benefits than disadvantages. In other words, the fact that an 
17 
 
 Also, the letter of the relevant TRIPS provision should militate in favour of a 
broader interpretation of the ordre public and morality clause, so as to apply it to food 
products and processes which are scientifically proven to be harmful to human health. 
Indeed, Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly specifies that human health falls 
within the category of interests protected by the morality and public policy clause.40 Even 
before TRIPS the expression ‘ordre public’ had been interpreted as including a large range of 
public policy grounds, and in particular any matter in the general interests of the state and 
society:41 and there is little doubt that the fight against obesity and other diseases caused by 
the consumption of harmful foodstuffs amounts to a strong interest of the state and society. 
Secondly, the proposal to exclude from patentability unhealthy food also seems in line with 
the very purpose of patent law, which is to incentivize the realization of inventions that are 
really useful to societies, not products or processes harmful to people’s health. 
 
Additional proposals? 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
invention produces real or potential benefits cannot ‘neutralize’ immoral aspects stemming from the 
exploitation of the same: see Sigrid Sterckx (n. 35 above) 487–90 and 494. The application of the 
deontological criterion to unhealthy inventions would again make such subject matter unpatentable on 
morality and ordre public grounds. 
40
 See n 33 above. 
41
 This interpretation was given by a UK committee when attempting to implement the requirements of 
the 1963 Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention 
(Strasbourg Convention 1963). See Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, The 
British Patent System: Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law (The 
Stationery Office, 1970) 68 [242]. 
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The above could be stand-alone proposals, but they could also be ‘merged’. The first and 
second proposals, for example, could be linked, so that applicants for healthy foodstuffs 
would not be required to pay fees for accelerated examination procedures. Also, countries 
particularly keen on protecting and promoting food security and good nutrition could provide 
a mix of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ measures and cumulatively: (i) set up a fast-track patent 
procedure for healthy food applicants; (ii) exempt such applicants from paying the relevant 
fees (or greatly reduce them); and (iii) exclude from patentability unhealthy foodstuffs. 
 Other proposals could be made with a view to amending patent regimes and 
encouraging the dissemination of healthy foodstuffs: namely extending the term of 
protection.42 The idea underlying this proposal is to provide extra years of patent protection 
in order to strongly encourage the making of healthy food products and processes. Such a 
proposal would probably be compliant with TRIPS as this treaty only requires states as a 
minimum standard to provide 20 years of protection counted from the filing date.43 That 
means that countries can offer inventors a longer term of protection if they so wish, as is also 
confirmed by TRIPS itself, which leaves WTO countries free ‘to implement in their law more 
extensive protection’.44 Yet, despite its formal compliance with TRIPS, I would not 
recommend such a proposal to be implemented. Indeed, extending the term of protection 
beyond the 20-year barrier would have undesirable anti-competitive effects by delaying the 
entrance into the public domain of socially relevant inventions. 
                                                 
42
 A similar proposal was mentioned in the early 1990s with reference to environmentally sound 
technologies by Nicola Atkinson and Brad Sherman in their article ‘Intellectual Property and 
Environmental Protection’ (1991) European Intellectual Property Review 165–70, 170; see also 
Derclaye (n. 11 above) 232. 
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 Article 1(1). 
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4. Objections and counter-arguments 
 
That said, one may note that the three proposals suggested in this chapter, by requiring that 
food inventions should be treated differently (more favourably in the first and second 
proposals and less favourably in the third one), provide a discriminatory treatment in favour 
of, or against, the food industry. This situation would therefore discriminate against other 
fields of technology and thus violate the TRIPS anti-discrimination rule: ‘patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of 
technology’.45 
 One may also argue that the proposals would make patenting procedures and related 
litigation in court rather cumbersome. They would first introduce difficulties for patent 
examiners and judges, that is in confirming that the relevant invention is either healthy (first 
and second proposals) or harmful to human health (third proposal). Fast-track procedures, in 
particular, would make the whole patenting process even more complicated and expensive to 
handle for patent offices, also taking into account that giving priority to certain inventions 
would require extra efforts from offices. All this would therefore amount to unreasonable 
conditions on the acquisition and maintenance of the patent, again, contrary to the TRIPS 
                                                 
45
 Article 27(1). Both negative and positive discrimination may be deemed inconsistent with this 
provision. As has been noted, ‘a law that unjustifiably favors patentees in one field of technology over 
all other fields can be just as discriminatory as a law that unjustifiably disadvantages patentees in one 
field of technology relative to all other fields’: see Maria Victoria Stout, ‘Crossing the TRIPS 
Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1’ 
(2008) Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 177–200, 182; see also Carlos 
Correa, ‘Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries’ (20) 3 Tulane Journal of 
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Agreement, which requires, as a condition of the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual 
property (IP) rights, countries’ ‘compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities’ 
(emphasis added).46 
 Yet such objections would be weak for the following reasons. 
 
Discrimination v differentiation 
 
I do believe that the proposals in question do not constitute a discriminatory treatment either 
against or in favour of the food industry. Far from constituting a discriminatory treatment, 
these proposals boil down to a lawful differential treatment that is necessary to meet a 
socially sensitive objective in a specific sector, namely the protection of human health. 
 As far as the first and second proposals are concerned, as it is accepted that patent 
law gives incentives to come up with new technologies, there is no reason in principle why 
public policy should not try to give greater incentives to develop specific products or 
processes that are considered particularly beneficial to society.47 Take the example of 
accelerated procedures in the field of green-technologies that – as we have seen – have 
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 Article 62(1). This provision has been interpreted by the WTO Panel in Canada–Term of Patent 
Protection, WT/DS170/R, Report of 5 May 2000. The Panel held that some Canadian patent law 
provisions (which required applicants to resort to delays such as abandonment of the application, 
reinstatement, non-payment of fees and non-response to a patent examiner’s report) would be 
inconsistent with the general principle that procedures should not be unnecessarily complicated as 
expressed in inter alia Article 62.1 TRIPS Agreement (paras 6.117–6.119 of the report). 
47
 Daniel Alexander, ‘Some Themes in Intellectual Property and the Environment’ (1993) 2(2) 
Intellectual Property and Environment 113–30, 116. The third proposal highlighted in this chapter also 
aims (at least indirectly) at encouraging the production of healthier food. Indeed, if food companies are 
aware that harmful food cannot be patented, they will probably switch to less harmful ones. 
21 
 
already been adopted in several jurisdictions. These have never provoked objections 
regarding possible discriminatory treatment over other fields of technology that do not have 
access to a similar preferential track (back in 1972 Rudolp E Blum made the point that a 
special status should be granted to inventions concerned with the protection of the 
environment, praising in particular the USA and Japan for granting such inventions a 
privileged and accelerated treatment).48 It would thus be difficult to claim that the first 
proposal put forward here, which shares similar features and is also meant to meet socially 
relevant targets, is discriminatory. The incentive-related argument could again be relied on to 
justify and legitimize fee waivers (or reductions) for patenting healthy food. It should also be 
noted that such a preferential scheme is not completely new, at least in the scripts of IP 
scholars: already in 1972 Freidrich-Karl Beier noted that ‘in the future, other possibilities for 
preferential treatment of socially important inventions might be adopted, such as reducing 
fees for the application, grant and maintenance of patents’.49 
 The distinction between unlawful ‘discrimination’ and lawful ‘differential treatment’ 
in the field of IP rights has already been stressed by the WTO Panel in Canada—Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical Products: the principle of discrimination – the Panel held – 
‘does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain 
product areas’.50 This finding sanctioned the lawfulness of certain Canadian exceptions to 
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 Rudolf E Blum, ‘The Threat to Our Environment and the Protection of Industrial Property’ (1973) 
Industrial Property 243–49, 248–49. 
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 Beier (n. 12 above) 445. 
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 Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc WT/DS114/R, 17 
March 2000, [7.92].  
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patents under Article 30 TRIPS that de facto targeted the pharmaceutical sector.51 Yet, the 
‘spirit’ of this finding could be relied on to also support a broad interpretation of ordre public 
and morality clauses such as the TRIPS and EPC ones, if not to create an ad hoc exclusion 
from patentability of unhealthy foodstuff (see above the first ‘negative’ proposal): indeed, 
excluding from patentability inventions harmful to humans could amount to a bona fide 
public health measure aimed at discouraging the development and dissemination of harmful 
food and accordingly defeating or at least mitigating serious extenuating circumstances. 
 No discrimination then, just lawful differentiation. Several other scholars have 
highlighted the need to consider the latter (as opposed to the former) as legitimate. For 
example, with particular reference to the pharmaceutical field, Frederick Abbott pointed out 
that, if specific rules applicable only to pharmaceutical patents are necessary to address 
important public interests such as the protection of public health, ‘this does not constitute 
“discrimination” against the field of pharmaceutical technology. It constitutes recognition of 
legitimate public interests in differential treatment.’52 
 Thus, when it comes to devising IP, and specifically patent legislations, 
governments should be able to adopt measures on public interest grounds – such as the 
proposals put forward in this chapter – to meet specific concerns in certain fields. This can 
also be inferred by Article 8 TRIPS: ‘Members may, in formulating or amending their laws 
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
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 The exceptions were the so-called ‘regulatory review provision’ (s. 55.2(1) of the Canadian Patent Act) 
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technological development’ (emphasis added). Analogous provisions can be found in 
bilateral investment and free-trade agreements, such as amongst others the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the EU and a group of Caribbean 
countries (CARIFORUM): ‘an adequate and effective enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should … allow the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States to protect public 
health and nutrition’ (emphasis added).53 The references in the above legislative texts to 
‘sectors of vital importance’ and in particular ‘public health’ and ‘nutrition’ are indeed to be 
interpreted as allowing states to take public interest measures in specific policy areas.54 
 
Differentiation and the refusal of the neutrality principle 
 
If proposals like the ones put forward in this chapter were eventually implemented, this 
would probably confirm that patents and inventions are not all ‘equal’ from a social utility 
perspective. Indeed, a patent covering a new and innovative bottle opener cannot be 
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 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM states, on one side, and the European 
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compared, say, to an anti-retroviral drug: everyone agrees that saving human lives is more 
socially important than finding easier ways of opening bottles. Patent legislators and judges 
would rather accept that difference and refuse to support what has often (and wrongly) been 
accepted in the past, that is a (by now) anachronistic and aseptic principle of neutrality of 
patents and of equal treatment of all inventions. This is also what several economic circles 
believe: as the journal The Economist has recently put it in an article highly critical of the 
current excesses of the patent system, differentiation between patent rights ‘for different sorts 
of innovation’ are possible and would be welcome.55 
 According to the neutrality principle, based on the laissez-faire model of modern 
capitalistic systems,56 patent law should only concern itself with granting a monopolistic right 
without assessing whether inventions, for example, are socially meritorious, jeopardize the 
environment or are harmful to human health which result in patent law becoming ‘technology 
neutral’ and meaning that the ‘wrong’ kind of technologies might attract patent protection,57 
for example, a particularly harmful food manufacturing process. Such a principle, which 
excludes value judgements in IP matters and treats all subject matter equally,58 has more in 
common with copyright law, as it would be unfair to subject the granting of copyright 
protection to judges’ subjective assessments regarding artistic and social merit. 
 Yet, extending this principle to patent law is wrong. An interesting point to note is 
that ‘despite patent law’s apparent neutrality, it [patent law] carries the seed of differentiation 
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and can therefore allow for special treatment’.59 First, we have seen that many jurisdictions 
already incorporate provisions – for example, the exclusion from patentability of inventions 
that are contrary to ordre public and morality as well as of surgical, diagnostic and 
therapeutic methods – which inject into patent laws social considerations and concerns and 
therefore legitimize differential treatment. The incorporation of public interest-focused 
provisions into patent statutes is not even a novelty of recent times. The first UK Patent 
Statute of 1623 already stated that a patent could only be granted if it was ‘not contrary to 
law or mischievous to the State’.60 This provision was confirmed in the UK Patent and 
Design Act of 188361 and in the Patent Act 1949 (when the predecessor of the current Patent 
Act already excluded from patentability inventions contrary to morality and ‘well-established 
natural laws’).62 
 That the neutrality principle is weak can be also inferred by looking at the IP clause 
of the US Constitution, which stresses that the reason why IP rights are granted is to promote 
the ‘Progress of Science and Useful Arts’.63 The rationale behind this clause is to promote the 
development of useful inventions by offering inventors monopolistic rights for a limited 
period of time. Yet, according to many commentators, the meaning of ‘progress’ (also) 
within that IP clause is not neutral. As has been noted, progress is not an end in itself, but 
                                                 
59
 Derclaye (n. 58 above) 251. 
60
 Statute of Monopolies, s 6. See Derclaye (n. 58 above) 258. 
61
 S 86 of this Act gave power to the Comptroller General of the Patent Office to reject a patent 
application if ‘the use would, in his opinion, be contrary to law or morality’. 
62
 S 19 of this Act provided refusal of patents ‘(1) if it appears to the comptroller in the case of any 
application for a patent—(a) that it is frivolous on the ground that it claims as an invention anything 
obviously contrary to well-established natural laws; or (b) that the use of the invention in respect of 
which the application is made would be contrary to law or morality’. 
63
 S 1(8) of the US Constitution. 
26 
 
rather an intermediate step towards other social goals.64 It should also include the 
improvement of human life, which in turn includes the general concept of well-being.65 That 
inevitably entails that inventions of highly social utility that are meant to deliver humanity 
greater benefits (like healthy foodstuff) fulfil that constitutional bargain better than inventions 
of little social value.66 
 Proposals that aim at providing a differential and more socially oriented legal 
treatment have also been put forward in relation to an IP right ‘close’ to patents, namely the 
plant variety rights protection that countries are required to adopt under TRIPS.67 It has 
indeed been proposed that such a system could be designed by introducing an additional 
condition, the so-called ‘value for cultivation and use’ requirement (VCU).68 Detailing the 
VCU requirement would then be left to national governments and would ensure that the 
developers of new plant varieties contribute to certain national priorities. For example, for a 
new variety to acquire protection, VCU might require applicants to demonstrate their socio-
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economic or environmental benefits, such as how it might benefit small farmers in terms of 
enhancing productivity or requiring fewer external inputs.69 
 
The paradox of the neutrality principle  
 
The neutrality principle of patents should also be rejected because of the paradox it creates. 
 For example, what if a patent office were to grant a patent in relation to an 
invention, say, covering a food product that contains a huge amount of saturated fat, sugar or 
salt? If we accept the neutrality principle, the patent would certainly be valid. Yet, due to 
increased awareness on the part of a number of legislators around the world keen to protect 
people’s health, the consumption of such a product could be prohibited in some countries or 
at least severely restricted by regulatory bodies, in order to avoid, for instance, consumption 
by children in schools (poor eating habits developed at an early age can lead to a lifetime of 
serious health consequences and school is where young people spend most of their time and 
where they lay the foundations for healthy habits). 
 The paradox therefore lies in the fact that in such circumstances public authorities – 
patent offices and regulatory bodies – would send contradictory messages.70 On the one hand, 
by granting patents they encourage and reward the making of inventions harmful to 
consumers and, on the other, by introducing strict regulatory measures they ban or limit the 
consumption of products incorporating such inventions. This inconsistent outcome comes 
from the very essence of the neutrality principle, according to which each area of the law has 
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a different and separate function to pursue and, accordingly, it is wrong for these functions to 
be confused and conflated.71 
 The rejection of the neutrality principle would eliminate this paradox and 
inconsistency and make patent law and food law compatible with each other and 
complementary (such a result probably being achieved by the implementation of the third 
proposal highlighted in this chapter, especially in countries that experience an upsurge in the 
filing of patent applications for unhealthy food). In actual fact, patent law, by excluding 
harmful food from patentability, might be more beneficial than food law, as the former would 
aim at discouraging the production of unhealthy products rather than merely restricting their 
consumption, which has been the aim of many regulatory measures under recent food 
legislation but which may also cause negative externalities: for example, a fat tax introduced 
by Denmark in 2011 to fight obesity and related diseases (hitting meat, pizza, butter, cheese, 
milk, oil and processed food if the product contained more than 2.3 per cent saturated fat) 
was later scrapped as it was perceived as regressive and as triggering cross-border trade.72 
 
Other arguments and counter-arguments in relation to the third proposal 
 
One may also note that excluding the patentability of unhealthy food products and processes 
would allow any food operator to develop and sell at a lower price products incorporating 
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such inventions because of the absence of monopolies granted by patents. Paradoxically, this 
would therefore increase the dissemination of harmful foodstuffs.73 
 This argument seems weak, however. The argument that granting patents that 
protect controversial inventions might have the effect of reducing the availability of the 
relevant goods is not really convincing. First, this is not always necessarily the case. Indeed, 
when a patented invention is commercially successful and socially desirable, this may well 
trigger a rapid and massive dissemination of the product, regardless of whether the patentee 
keeps the price low or high. Second, the extent the invention is used should not really 
influence how patent law regulates patentable or unpatentable subject matter, especially when 
public authorities do not want to encourage research in controversial fields such as the 
development of unhealthy foods. As has been correctly pointed out, ‘if the moral worth of an 
invention is debatable, then the degree in which it is exploited should not temper the law’s 
attitude to it’.74 
 Another argument that may be used to oppose the third proposal revolves around the 
ordre public and morality clause contained in several patent legislations. As already 
highlighted, such a provision excludes from patentability inventions whose exploitation is 
contrary to public policy and accepted principles of morality. Yet such exploitation – as made 
clear in TRIPS and the EPC, for example – is not deemed immoral or against ordre public 
simply because it is prohibited by local laws or regulations.75 A similar provision is contained 
in the Paris Convention: ‘the grant of a patent shall not be refused and a patent shall not be 
invalidated on the ground that the sale of the patented product or of a product obtained by 
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means of a patented process is subject to restrictions or limitations resulting from the 
domestic law’.76 These rules basically entail that an inventor would still be able to get a 
patent from a patent office even where the regulatory body of that country prohibits the 
exploitation of the relevant product or process. The rationale is that, if it is the case that 
further evidence is later brought that convinces the regulatory body to lift the ban, the still 
valid patent would then become exploitable. 
 Yet, such rules and rationale would not fit well with the patenting of a foodstuff that 
is undisputedly considered unhealthy. Take a food invention containing a hugely excessive 
amount in fat, saturated fat, salt or sugar. Pursuant to the above mentioned rules, that 
invention would still be patentable even when, as is highly likely, the consumption of the 
relevant product or process is severely restricted on food safety grounds. Yet, in this case 
chances are slim that regulatory bodies might be convinced by new evidence about an alleged 
lack of harmful effects. 
 It would therefore be recommendable to modify the above TRIPS, EPC and Paris 
Convention provisions. That could be done by specifying that, where the ban or restriction of 
the exploitation of a product or process is based on clear and indisputable scientific evidence 
(such as in the case of food containing an excessive amount of fat, saturated fat, salt or 
sugar), countries would still be able to exclude that invention from patentability on ordre 
public or morality grounds. Such a legislative move would again make patent law and food 
law align in pursuit of the same goal. 
 Finally, it could be argued that the third proposal might not be good and effective 
because – it could be stressed – what is harmful to human health is not the occasional 
consumption of, say, foodstuffs containing an excessive amount of transfat or sugar. Rather, 
it is the continued and systematic consumption of such food that would be harmful. In other 
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words, we should not talk about unhealthy food, but just about unhealthy diets. However, this 
argument also seems weak. A product or process should be deemed unpatentable – I believe 
– because of its inherent capability to harm people’s health, no matter what amount is 
necessary to actually cause such harm. If we were to accept that it is only the abuse of a 
certain invention that triggers its unpatentability on ordre public or morality grounds, the 
result would be absurd. For example, an extremely polluting exhaust pipe for cars might 
attract patent protection on the assumption that its occasional use by a car driver would not 
have hugely negative effects on the environment (such effects would only materialize in case 
of cumulative use by a broad category of users). Yet, what should be taken into account for 
the purposes of deciding whether an invention must be excluded from patentability again is 
not how much the relevant product or process is used, but its inherent ability to harm people, 
the environment and other public goods.  
 
Unreasonable and cumbersome proposals?  
 
I also believe the three proposals in question do not create unreasonable conditions on the 
acquisition of patents on food related inventions. They therefore do not run contrary to 
TRIPS.77 
 First, they would not place excessively heavy burdens on patent offices and 
applicants. The objection that patent offices and judges would be ill-equipped to verify 
whether the relevant food product or process is healthy or harmful (a task beyond the skills of 
patent officers) could be overcome. For example, patent officers could be partnered with 
experts, such as professors and specialists in food safety, who could be questioned about 
technical issues. The idea of getting experts involved in patent procedures is indeed not new, 
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as some patent offices already rely on them, for example, when dealing with biotechnological 
inventions.78 The latest developments in food safety and nutritional science would also help 
overcome the scientific uncertainties that have for a long time surrounded the distinction 
between healthy and unhealthy foods. Indeed, efforts have recently been made by regulators 
to devise an appropriate categorization system that allows for the differentiation of foods that 
are high in fat, saturated fat, salt or sugar. The UK Food Standards Agency has, for instance, 
developed a nutrient profiling model as a tool for categorizing foods for children on the basis 
of objective criteria and, in particular, their nutrient content.79 This model, which has been 
adopted by the UK media and communications regulator Ofcom to regulate the advertising 
and promotion of foods to children, uses a simple scoring system that recognizes the 
contribution made by beneficial nutrients that are important in a child’s diet (i.e. protein, 
fibre, fruit and vegetables, and nuts) and penalizes foods with ingredients that children should 
eat less of (saturated fats, salt and sugars). 
 Also, the fact that applicants would obtain an expedited examination and would not 
be required to pay fees to patent their healthy food inventions does not make the first and 
second proposals described in this chapter unfeasible. It could indeed be said that examining 
patent applications – which involves a significant amount of work by examiners – quickly or 
without charging fees would make the whole procedure cumbersome and thus unreasonably 
difficult to manage. Yet, I believe such an objection could be overcome by re-emphasizing 
that these procedures are aimed at pursuing an overriding public interest, hence rendering 
rather weak any allegation that the system would be unfeasible (and anyway understaffed 
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patent offices could be supplemented by hiring more experts in the specific field). As has 
been noted in relation to US fast-track procedures for green technologies, requiring extra fees 
for receiving the accelerated review would upset ‘the balance of the constitutional patent 
bargain by over-burdening the parties most likely to promote “the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts” (Section 1(8) if the US Constitution)’.80 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted a serious problem of contemporary society – namely the obesity 
and other NCDs caused by the consumption of unhealthy food – and how such problem may 
be tackled by also relying on patent regimes. 
 I do believe that the patent system could play a positive role in this specific regard, 
by encouraging (not mandating) food companies and inventors to produce and bring to 
market healthier foodstuffs. I am indeed convinced that patent law has the potential to modify 
behaviours to promote good corporate and scientific conduct.81 Conversely, I oppose views 
that consider the patent system as neutral to, and insulated from, any public policy 
considerations including human health. In other papers, I have made the point that public 
policy and morality related concerns are actually embedded in and permeate the patent 
system and that the latter should therefore serve as a social filter.82 In other words, patent law 
cannot be considered in a vacuum nor can it neglect considerations and concerns related to 
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products and processes whose exploitation poses serious threats to society,83 such as the 
diseases caused by the consumption of unhealthy food. Conversely, patent law should be 
considered as the servant of public policy and be justified by the benefits it is capable of 
bringing.84 This is even more so if we look at the general purpose of the patent system, that 
is, to incentivize (before) and reward (after) the making of inventions useful to our society. 
The proposals put forward in this chapter serve that purpose: that is, they would aim to push 
research and development in the food industry towards healthier paths – and would do so by 
stretching the capacity of the patent system to respond to new public policy challenges and to 
be complementary to another area of law, namely food law. 
 By either facilitating and speeding up the patenting process of healthy food or by 
excluding harmful ones from patentability, the implementation of these proposals would send 
clear messages that: (i) inventions which are of a greater social value, like healthy foodstuffs, 
should be patented faster and more cheaply and thus reach markets more quickly; and (ii) 
patenting ‘anything under the sun which is made by man’85 would not be possible anymore.86 
 Also, the proposals put forward in this chapter are in line with some recent studies, 
such as the ‘happiness and IP’ related research carried out by Estelle Derclaye: this scholar 
rightly noted that if we want patents and related rights to be legitimate, we need to go further 
and base patent regimes on stronger universal values and goals.87 In other words, patent law 
should focus more on ‘needs’, not ‘wants’, and therefore encourage investments in 
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necessities, not luxuries.88 It should be used not only for merely economic purposes but also 
as a tool to regulate the impact of technology on the environment or health.89 The argument 
that IP law should take into account sustainable development is not new and has recently 
been put forward by other academics such as Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,90 as well as Lionel 
Bently and Brad Sherman.91 The latter scholars in particular noted that:  
there is no reason why the patent system, as a regulatory tool, should only be used in 
the pursuit of economic ends, nor any reason why ‘external’ factors such as … health 
should not fall within the core remit of the patent system … arguments of this nature 
are beginning to have an influence on patent law, particularly in relation to … food 
security.92 
 As shown above, I also believe that the proposals put forward in this chapter would 
not place excessively heavy burdens on patent offices. The assessment of the harmfulness or 
healthiness of products or processes does not seem an insuperable obstacle. Integrating 
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technical experts into patent examiners’ teams would help in confirming whether a food 
related invention carries the health benefits claimed in the application. 
 The proposed fast-track procedure for patenting healthy food may also be promising. 
A quick look at the data gathered with reference to the accelerated programmes already 
implemented in some countries in the field of green technologies is quite telling: the time 
taken to grant patents in this sector has been cut by between 42 per cent and 75 per cent, with 
the shortest time to grant being delivered by the UK (75 per cent).93 If such programmes 
work for green technologies, there is no reason why similar systems could not work for 
healthy food. As stressed by the former Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), David 
Kappos, ‘we’re already experimenting with various ways of enabling applicants to receive 
accelerated review of technologies in areas that are priorities … like green technology … and 
we’ll be considering accelerated reviews in other categories of innovation that are also vital 
to our national interests’.94 
 Obviously, the proposals in question are not being put forward as the only solution 
to combatting obesity and other illnesses caused by consumption of unhealthy foods. Yet, 
they may be part of a wider global and national answer aimed at fighting such diseases, 
including tax incentives for the production of healthier food. 
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